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Abstract 
In Japan, the aid administration system was very complicated. Although there were more 
than ten government agencies involved in Japan’s ODA program, the aid administration 
had been dominated by three ministries and one agency – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industries (MITI) and the Economic Planning Agency (EPA) before the organisational 
structural reforms took place in 2001. On the other hand, under the ancien régime of 
Japan’s aid policy, there were three main aid-implementing institutions in Japan. The 
oldest is Japan’s Export-Import Bank (Eximbank). It played a prominent part in Japan’s 
economic co-operation during the 1950s. The second institution is the Japan 
International Co-operation Agency (JICA), which is mainly in charge of technical co-
operation projects. The Overseas Economic Co-operation Fund (OECF) provides 
bilateral loans to developing countries. This paper made an attempt to identify the main 
characteristics of Japanese aid administrative system before the aid administrative 
reforms. This is mainly because the ancien régime had strongly influenced and had 
shaped the forty-years of Japanese aid giving history before the bureaucratic 
restructuring took place. Nevertheless, despite the recent changes the basic problems of 
Japanese aid giving-mechanism, such as inter-ministerial conflicts and rivalries, remain 
same as before.    
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1. Introduction 
In Japan, the aid administration system was very complicated. Orr (1993a: 26) points out 
that though there were more than ten government agencies involved in Japan’s ODA 
program, aid administration had been dominated by three ministries and one agency - the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industries (MITI) and the Economic Planning Agency (EPA). 
 
On the other hand, there were three main aid-implementing institutions in Japan. The 
oldest is Japan’s Export-Import Bank (Eximbank). It played a prominent part in Japan’s 
economic co-operation during the 1950s. The second institution is the Japan International 
Co-operation Agency (JICA), which is mainly in charge of technical co-operation 
projects. The Overseas Economic Co-operation Fund (OECF) provides bilateral loans to 
developing countries (Furuoka, 2006).  
 
Orr (1993a: 26) calls them the “Four Senior Players”, and other ministries the “Junior 
Players” of Japan’s ODA administration. Orr asserts that junior players are not 
considered formal participants in Japan’s aid policymaking, their influence is 
insignificant and they have limited access to information on the ODA program. 
 
An aid officer from a “Junior Player” ministry admits that though his ministry has been 
engaged in ODA activities, without specialists on economic development or political 
conditions in the recipient countries, the ministry has to rely on MOFA when holding 
negotiations on ODA programs (Furuoka, 2006). 
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In April 2001, there were changes within Japanese bureaucracy. The MITI absorbed the 
EPA and became the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) while the MOF 
and MOFA retained same structures. Also, in 1999, the Japan Export-Import Bank 
(Eximbank) and Overseas Economic Co-operation Fund (OECF) merged into a new entity, 
the Japan Bank for International Co-operation (JBIC).  
 
This paper describes the organisational structures of Japan’s foreign aid policy before the 
aid administrative reforms because the ancien régime had strongly influenced and had 
shaped the forty-years of Japanese aid giving history before the bureaucratic restructuring 
took place.1 Despite the recent changes inter-ministerial conflicts and rivalries remain.    
  
2. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) 
  The MOFA has always played a central role in Japan’s ODA policy (see Figure 1 for 
organizational structure of the MOFA). As Hirata (1998: 314) put it, “(The) MOFA is the 
most prominent ministry concerned with Japan’s aid. It not only participates in decision-
making on loan aid through the four-ministry system, but also takes responsibility for 
Japanese grant aid”. The Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA), an important 
aid-implementing agency, is under the MOFA’s jurisdiction. The MOFA is in charge of 
coordinating ODA activities between the ministries that have their own budgets for 
economic assistance. Rix claims that the MOFA’s traditional ineffectiveness in domestic 
politics round is not matched by the realities of foreign aid policy. The MOFA often 
plays an important role in decision-making of Japan’s ODA policies (Rix, 1980: 87).   
 
                                                          
1 The detailed discussions on a history of Japan’s foreign aid policy, see Furuoka (2007a). 
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Within the MOFA, the Economic Co-operation Bureau is in charge of bilateral ODA, 
while multilateral ODA is the responsibility of the Multilateral Co-operation Department 
under the Foreign Policy Bureau.  There are seven divisions under the Economic 
Planning Bureau: 1) Aid Policy Division, 2) Research & Programming, 3) Multilateral 
Co-operation, 4) Technical Co-operation, 5) Development Co-operation, 6) Loan Aid, 7) 
Grant Aid, under the Economic Co-operation Bureau, and three sub-divisions: a) 
Overseas Disaster Assistance, b) Non-Governmental Organizations Assistance, c) 
Evaluation.  
 
Hiroyasu Kobayashi, an aid officer in the MOFA, maintains that the MOFA has 
successfully carried out inter-ministry coordination, although Japan’s ODA budget in FY 
1996 was divided between nineteen ministries and agencies. He points out that, firstly, 
the MOFA gets the largest share of total the ODA budget (about 50 percent), followed by 
the MOF (about 40 percent). Secondly, the remainder (10 percent of the ODA budget) - 
the part mainly spent on technical co-operation - is divided between the other seventeen 
government offices. Technical co-operation is carried out by JICA, an aid- implementing 
agency under the MOFA’s control (Kokusai Kaihatsu Janaru, April 1995: 89-91). 
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State Secretary for Foreign Affairs 
Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs 
Minister’s Secretariat 
Foreign Policy Bureau
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Treaties Bureau 
Intelligence & Analysis Bureau 
 
Figure 1: Organization Chart of the MOFA 
Source: Furuoka (2006) 
 
Another important function of the MOFA is to be Japan’s “window” on the world. This 
makes the MOFA susceptible to foreign criticisms and pressures. Orr (1993b: 7) observes 
that the MOFA is usually more in accord with what Western countries regard as foreign 
aid. Hirata adds that the MOFA is the most sensitive of all ministries to foreign pressure 
on its aid policy. “It (the MOFA) tried to respond to the external demands on Japan’s aid 
 5
policy” (Hirata, 1998: 314). On the other hand, this role is a source of the MOFA’s 
strength. According to Rix, the power of the MOFA sprang from its management of 
Japan’s foreign relations. For a long time the Ministry has been the official channel for all 
Japanese aid activities, “a function it jealously guards” (Rix, 1980: 87). 
 
Despite its international recognition, the MOFA has almost no means of influencing 
Japan’s domestic politics. Ahn (1998: 49) asserts that the MOFA cannot enjoy “social 
backing” for its policy, because the popular support of foreign policy issues is neither 
frequent nor clear-cut. Hirata claims that the MOFA’s position in domestic politics is 
vulnerable because it lacks a constituency. She also points out that due to its weak 
domestic position, the MOFA uses foreign pressure (gaiatsu) as an argument to its own 
advantage. “(The) MOFA often tries to persuade other ministries that the gaiatsu on the 
Japanese government is so high that the government has to comply with it. By 
successfully playing the gaiatsu card, the ministry can strengthen its own domestic 
position” (Hirata, 1998: 315).      
 
3. The Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
Bureaucrats are the elite of Japanese society, and the MOF’s officers are regarded by the 
Japanese as the elite’s crème de la crème (see Figure 2 for the organizational structure of 
the MOF).  
 
Alan Rix maintains that in Japan, the aid administration lays in the hands of the national 
bureaucracy, a system bound by tradition and myth. The popular literature in Japan 
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would have it that a career in the MOF is the pinnacle of personal achievement. Thus, the 
image of the MOF among the general public is often equated with supremacy in policy-
making. However, Rix points out that these ideas of pretension to elitism do not by 
themselves bring power in government. In foreign aid, for example, the MOF is one 
among many, although “admittedly its control of budgets gave it principal leverage in 
inter-ministry discussions” (Rix, 1980: 87). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Minister of Finance 
State Secretary for Finance 
Vice-Minister for Finance 
Minister’s Secretariat 
Budget Bureau 
Tax Bureau 
Customs & Tariff Bureau 
Financial Bureau 
Financial System Planning Bureau 
International Bureau 
Figure 2: Organization Chart of the MOF 
Source: Furuoka (2006) 
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Orr (1993b: 8) asserts that the source of the MOF’s influence sprang from its control of 
the budget and the ministry maintains a considerable influence over Japan’s ODA policy 
by controlling the final steps of the creation of the foreign aid budget. Hirata (1998: 318-
319) maintains that the MOF views ODA as mainly related to its impact on Japan’s 
national budget. Unlike the MOFA, the MOF does not formulate ODA policy from the 
framework of foreign policy, and thus does not find it urgent to respond to international 
pressures to improve the quality of Japan’s aid. 
 
The MOF acts as a “banker” of Japan’s aid programs. The ministry is reluctant to provide 
grants and prefers to give loans instead. Orr (1993b: 8) claims that the MOF’s preference 
for loans over grants stems from the fact that its rival, the MOFA, has much more control 
over grants. Hirata (1998: 320) offers two reasons to explain this trend, 1) loans imply 
repayment and thus cost less money for Japan in the long run, and 2) loans are under the 
MOF’s jurisdiction. She criticizes such an attitude because it creates obstacles to the 
MOFA’s efforts to implement aid projects in the social sector, which are usually financed 
through grants. Also, the MOF prefers to give aid through Multilateral Development 
Banks because it has sole control over this aid. 
 
4. The Ministry of International Trade and Industries (MITI) 
  MITI is one of the most powerful ministries that control the destination of “Japan Inc.” 
It plans and manages Japan’s industrial policies (see Figure 3 for organizational structure 
of MITI).  
  
Within MITI, the Economic Co-operation Department under the International Trade 
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Policy Bureau plays an important role in aid policy. There are three divisions and one 
office under the Department: 1) the Economic Co-operation Division, 2) the Technical 
Co-operation Division, 3) the Regional Co-operation Division, and 4) the Financial Co-
operation Office. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Minister of International Trade & Industries 
State Secretary for International Trade & Industries 
Vice-Ministers for International Trade & Industries 
Machinery & Information Industries Bureau 
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Industrial Policy Bureau 
International Trade Administration Bureau 
International Trade Policy Bureau 
Minister’s Secretariat 
 
Figure 3: Organization Chart of MITI 
Source: Furuoka (2006) 
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The Economic Co-operation Division is in charge of coordinating overall administrative 
affairs in the department, while the Regional Co-operation Division is responsible for 
regional forums, such as the Asian Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) and the Asia-
Europe Meeting (ASEM). 
 
Chalmers Johnson vividly described the leadership role of MITI in Japan’s economic 
development in his book “MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial 
Policy, 1925-1975”. Johnson argues that the real equivalent of MITI in the US is not the 
Department of Commerce but the Department of Defence, which by its very nature and 
functions shares MITI’s strategy. He points out that the MITI-led Japanese industrial 
policy is similar to that surrounding the domestic expression “military-industrial 
complex” referring to a close working relationship between government and business to 
solve the problem of national defence (Johnson, 1982: 21).      
 
MITI acts as a “Commercial Officer” in Japan’s ODA program. Its main concern is 
Japan’s economic development and it aspires to use foreign aid as a tool for Japan’s 
economic growth. Rix asserts that MITI has become one of the largest and most powerful 
domestic ministries due to its control and direction of Japan’s post-war industrial and 
trade growth. As he put it, “This strength spilled over into aid policy at several points, 
especially as loans are given to industrial and resources projects” (Rix, 1980: 89). 
 
MITI’s emphasis on the commercial elements in the ODA programs contradicts the 
MOFA’s efforts to improve the quality of aid. As a result, serious conflicts arise between 
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these two powerful ministries. Orr (1993b: 8) asserts that MITI represents Japanese 
companies’ interests and pursues commercial gains. MITI also opposes the MOFA’s 
efforts to increase amounts of foreign aid.  Hirata reminds that MITI was very concerned 
about the fact that Japanese companies could not win bids for Japan’s ODA programs. 
“MITI has recently begun to advocate the revitalization of the tied aid policy to allow 
only Japanese firms to participate in projects financed through Japan’s foreign aid” 
(Hirata, 1998: 321). 
 
MITI’s influence has been weakening recently. According to Orr (1993b: 8), no one 
would deny that in the 1960s Japan’s aid was unabashedly designed to promote country’s 
exports, and MITI led the charge. However, the Ministry has lost a lot of its power with 
the evolution of Japan’s ODA. Hirata (1998: 320) agrees that MITI had a dominating 
influence in aid administration in the 1960s and in the early 1970s, when Japan’s ODA 
was purposely designed to promote Japan’s external trade and investment. However, its 
influence gradually declined over the years as the focus of Japan’s aid broadened from 
economic concerns to include political and strategic factors. 
 
5. The Economic Planning Agency (EPA) 
As the brain behind Japan’s economic policy, the EPA (see Figure 4) maps out economic 
plans and analyses their macro-economic implication. Rix (1980: 89) points out that 
although the EPA is the architect of economic plans, it is a minor player within the 
bureaucracy.  
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The EPA has been guiding economic policy since the 1950s, and has allied foreign aid 
loosely with exports and investment goals. 
 
Within the EPA, the First and the Second Economic Co-operation Divisions are in charge 
of economic co-operation. They are responsible for planning and co-ordination of ODA 
policies and programs. The First Economic Co-operation Division is also in charge of 
supervising the Overseas Economic Co-operation Fund (OECF) and represents the EPA 
in inter-ministerial meetings. 
 
 
Minister of State for Economic Planning 
State Secretary for Economic Planning 
Vice-Minister for Economic Planning 
Research Bureau 
Planning Bureau 
Price Bureau 
Social Policy Bureau 
Co-ordination Bureau
Minister’s Secretariat 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Organization Chart of the EPA 
Source: Furuoka (2006)  
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The EPA is a “minor player” among the four influential government agencies engaged in 
Japan’s ODA and it does not have much clout in ODA policymaking. According to Orr 
(1993a: 53), the agency has resigned itself to a minor position. Other powerful ministries, 
especially the MOF, have a strong influence on the EPA. 
 
The agency supports the expansion of ODA from the point of economic implications. As 
Robert Orr (1993b: 9) put it, “The EPA, in general, tends to favour the Ministry of 
Finance. One of the reasons is because the Ministry of Finance has many of its top 
ranking officers seconded to the EPA”.      
 
 6. Japan’s Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) 
The Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) was established in 1950 with the aim of promoting 
international trade. In the beginning, the Bank only gave loans to trade-related companies 
in Japan. However, its commitments have gradually expanded and the Bank started to 
finance foreign projects, such as the Sumatra Oil Project and the Alaska Pipe Project in 
1953. The Eximbank was the main agent for bilateral loans from 1958 to 1975, when the 
OECF undertook the provision of almost all Japanese bilateral loans (Kokusai Kaihatsu 
Janaru, February 1995: 103-105). 
 
According to Hiroshi Hoda, the President of the Eximbank, demarcation between the 
Eximbank and the OECF is clear. The Eximbank is a governmental banking institution 
that gives commercial loans to paying projects, while the OECF is an ODA implementing 
agency that gives Yen Loans to development projects, including projects where there 
may be no reimbursement (Kokusai Kaihatsu Janaru, February 1995: 101). 
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Hoda describes the role of the Eximbank. In the 1960s, the main task of the Eximbank 
was to give loans to mega-projects in developing countries that were aimed at the 
development of natural resources, such as petroleum or coal. After the “oil crisis” in the 
1970s, the Eximbank started giving loans for development of alternative natural 
resources, such as natural gas and uranium. In the 1980s, following the increasing 
Japanese direct investment, the Eximbank extended support to the Japanese 
multinationals’ activities. Nowadays, the Bank is shifting its focus from supporting 
Japanese firms to helping developing countries. The Bank intends to do this through co-
operation with international financial organizations, such as the World Bank and the IMF 
(Kokusai Kaihatsu Janaru, February 1995: 98-99). 
 
Eximbank’s new task is the distribution of untied loans. During the financial crisis in 
Latin America in the 1980s, the Japanese government declared that it would provide 
US$65 billion to help stabilize those countries’ financial systems.2 The Eximbank was 
charged by the Japanese government to undertake this task (Kokusai Kaihatsu Janaru, 
February 1995: 107). 
 
 7. The Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA) 
 The first organization in charge of technical co-operation, the Association for Asian 
Industrial Co-operation, was founded by MITI in 1953. The association received 
                                                          
2 The detailed discussions on Japan’s aid policy, especially aid sanction policy, toward Latin American 
countries, see Furuoka (2007b).  
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technical trainees from Indonesia and Thailand3 and dispatched industrial specialists to 
Taiwan. In 1962, this task was undertaken by the newly established Overseas Technical 
Co-operation Agency (OTCA). In 1974, the OTCA and Japan Emigration Service 
merged into a single agency – the Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA) - that 
was put in charge of technical co-operation (Kokusai Kaihatsu Janaru, May 1992: 134). 
  
A serious inter-ministry conflict arose during the setting up of JICA. Each ministry 
demanded that a new aid-implementing agency was put under its jurisdiction. JICA was 
established as a compromise between the ministries. Rix (1980: 49-55) describes the 
establishment of JICA as a “scrap and build” process. He points out that JICA’s final 
shape was unexpected, the result of a hurried attempt to resolve an impasse over a rival 
budget proposal where in the final outcome the discussion centred on the merits of 
combining the existing agencies rather than on the benefits of JICA. 
 
Before JICA was created there had been several calls for establishing a central aid 
agency. In 1967, Foreign Minister Takeo Miki announced that such an agency was being 
considered. However, the MOFA hesitated to set it up as it preferred the existing status 
quo. In 1972, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) requested the MOF to 
establish a new agency – the Overseas Agricultural Co-operation Agency (OACA) -for 
the development of agriculture in developing countries. At the same time, another 
ministry, MITI, requested funds to set up a new agency – the Overseas Trade 
Development Co-operation (OTDC) - for the development of international trade. 
                                                          
3 Indonesia and Thailand had become important recipients of Japanese foreign aid since then. The detailed 
discussions on Japan’s aid policy, especially aid sanction policy, toward Indonesia and Thailand, see 
Furuoka (2007c).   
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Apparently, each of the three ministries strived to secure control over Japan’s aid policy. 
When the issue reached a serious impasse, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka intervened and 
personally held negotiations with the ministries involved (Kokusai Kaihatsu Janaru, May 
1992: 133-135). 
 
According to Rix (1980: 49-55), the political bargaining forced a hurried compromise 
and left no room for considering implications for future policy. For example, the 
Japanese government decided to scrap the OTCA that was performing its duties well. The 
agency became a victim of political circumstance and the decision to dismantle it cannot 
be considered a genuine attempt to improve Japan’s technical assistance.  
 
Mitsuya Araki, the editor of the Kokusai Kaihatsu Janaru, argues that JICA’s “vertical 
cleavage” organization reflects its history. Under JICA’s scheme, both MITI and the 
MAF independently carry out their own technical co-operation. Each ministry seconded 
their officers to JICA, thus securing control over technical co-operation (e.g. MITI for 
industrial co-operation, the MAF for agricultural co-operation) (Kokusai Kaihatsu 
Janaru, August 1998: 6-7). 
 
Orr (1993a: 57-59) maintains that JICA’s organizational problem is an excessive number 
of non-JICA officers from various ministries. Due to the MOFA’s jurisdiction over JICA, 
the President of JICA is normally appointed from among former top ranking officers of 
the MOFA. However, each divisional head is seconded from the various ministries, often 
from MITI or the MOF. Out of 18 divisions in JICA, MITI and the MOF secured three 
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positions each of divisional head.                
 
8. The Overseas Economic Co-operation Fund (OECF) 
The Overseas Economic Co-operation Fund (OECF) was established in 1961. Since 
1975, it has been distributing almost all Japanese bilateral loans. The OECF was formed 
after the Asian Development Fund in the Eximbank was reorganized by Prime Minister 
Kishi Nobusuke. Thus, the OECF shared responsibilities and was in partnership with the 
Eximbank in the early stages of the organization’s development.  
 
According to Alan Rix, the creation of the OECF was the first official step toward an aid 
policy that tried to support the Less Developed Countries’ (LDC) development interests. 
“The OECF provided a mechanism ostensibly separate from export promotion, offering 
loans at an interest rate well below that available from the Export-Import Bank” (Rix, 
1993: 23).   
 
The arrangement for the administrative control of the OECF posed difficulties and caused 
frictions because it came within the power of all of the three rival ministries (the MOFA, 
the MOF and MITI) that were already managing Japan’s aid relations. To avoid having 
the OECF associated too closely with any of the above-mentioned ministries, the 
responsibility of managing the Fund was given to the EPA. This means that the OECF 
was placed under a domestically weak agency. At the same time, officials from other 
ministries entered the Fund in strategic policy positions. The OECF was emasculated 
from the start and was made subordinate to bureaucratic interests rather than to those 
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objectives of international development that were stipulated in the OECF law (Rix, 1980: 
35).  
 
The OECF’s loans are given and reimbursed in Japanese currency. If the Japanese Yen is 
weak, the recipient countries are less burdened when they return loans. There are 
criticisms that the appreciation of the Japanese Yen has brought difficulties to aid 
recipients. Akira Nishigaki, the president of the OECF, responded to the criticisms by 
reminding that although the OECF’s loans are financed from the government budget, the 
money partly comes from the Japanese people’s savings. That is why the loans should be 
reimbursed in the same amount of Japanese currency (Kokusai Kaihatsu Janaru, June 
1995: 82-85).  
 
Nishigaki and Shimomura (1993: 48-49) reviewed the budget structure of Japan’s ODA 
and pointed out that the OECF was financed through the Fiscal Investment and Loan 
Program (FILP). This is a huge amount of money that is sometimes referred to as a 
“special account” (tokubetsu kaikei) in Japan’s budget. Orr (1993b: 3-4) notes the fact 
that FILP derives its funds from postal savings and points out that the consequence of the 
Ministry of Finance’s dependency on FILP for the OECF funding is that the aid process 
tends to favour loans over grants, because loans allow for repayment to the millions of 
postal savers involved.     
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9. Conclusion 
Throughout more than forty years of Japan’s ODA history, the country’s aid 
administration has been not developing in a systematic manner. Japanese aid 
administration had been dominated by three ministries and one agency – the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Ministry of International 
Trade and Industries (MITI) and the Economic Planning Agency (EPA). 
 
On the other hand, under the ancien régime of Japan’s aid policy, there were three main 
aid-implementing institutions in Japan. The oldest is Japan’s Export-Import Bank 
(Eximbank). It played a prominent part in Japan’s economic co-operation during the 
1950s. The second institution is the Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA), 
which is mainly in charge of technical co-operation projects. The Overseas Economic 
Co-operation Fund (OECF) provides bilateral loans to developing countries.  
 
This paper made attempted to identify main characteristics of Japan’s foreign aid 
administration system before its reforms. This is because the ancien régime of Japan’s aid 
administration had shaped the forty-years of Japanese aid giving history before the 
bureaucratic restructuring took place. Nevertheless, despite the recent changes the basic 
problems of Japanese aid giving-mechanism, such as inter-ministerial conflicts and 
rivalries, remain same as before.    
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